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Abstract 
 
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) derive entry thresholds (equilibrium numbers of firms) for local 
markets but do not investigate actual entry and exit flows. This paper investigates for thirteen 
Belgian retail and service industries whether markets with actual numbers of firms higher 
(lower) than the thresholds display exit (entry) in subsequent periods. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Local markets are a key characterization of many service industries like plumbers, dentists, 
shoe stores, flower shops or restaurants. The (equilibrium) number of firms in these local 
service markets will be primarily dependent upon local demand. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), 
in an oft-cited article, derive and estimate their so-called entry threshold, a measure of the 
market size required to support a given number of firms. The entry threshold is a zero-profit 
equilibrium level of demand (see also Schmalensee, 1992 and Sutton, 1991) which can be 
estimated using ordered probit analysis. Although the title of their article “Entry and 
Competition in Concentrated Markets” would suggest differently, their article does not 
consider actual entry into markets, nor exit. The current paper investigates whether markets 
that have less firms than the entry threshold show (net) entry of firms in the subsequent period 
and markets that have more firms than this threshold show (net) exit of firms. 
Bresnahan and Reiss remark that more complete data on entry and exit (in local markets) is 
required to investigate the timing of entry and exit decisions. This is important to progress 
from an essentially static cross-sectional framework as developed by Bresnahan and Reiss 
towards a dynamic framework of entry and exit adjusting for market disequilibria. We have 
compiled a dataset for a range of carefully selected service industries in the 455 local regions 
(municipalities) of Belgium with less than 20,000 inhabitants. These data include number of 
firms, entry, exit and factors determining market size. The analysis suggests that the entry rate 
is much more flexible and more important in the adjustment process towards market 
equilibrium than the exit rate.  
 
2. Entry thresholds from ordered probit analysis 
 
This research deviates from earlier research, like Asplund and Sandin (1999), Brenahan and 
Reiss and Serra et al. (1999), to empirically examine local entry and exit rates. Number of 
entries, exits and incumbents are obtained for all 455 Belgian municipalities whose local 
market size (measured by population) is less than 20,000 (source: Belgian National Institute 
of Statistics).1 The data are derived from the stock of active taxable firms and self-employed 
(in the value-added-tax books) at the end of each year, as well as the number of registrations 
and deletions per year, from 1998 to 2001. Explanatory variables include: population and 
personal income per capita in 1998; net number of commuters (commuting ‘in’ minus ‘out’) 
                                                 
1 One municipality, Herstappe, with 84 inhabitants, was left out from the analyses. 
according to the 1991 census and population growth from 1990 to 1998. There are three 
dummy variables: a Flanders dummy (1 if Flanders; 0, otherwise); a City dummy for the 
presence of a city with more than 20,000 inhabitants less than ten kilometers away; and a 
Border dummy (1 if the municipality is on the border of a neighboring foreign country; 0, 
otherwise). 
Special attention was paid to select retail and consumer service industries that are composed 
of firms with similar economic activities. We opted for an industrial definition according to 
five-digits NACE-Belgium. The industries are selected to have their firms dependent upon 
local market conditions and to be commonly present in local markets (municipalities). That is, 
industries with a large majority of municipalities with zero firms are left out of consideration. 
In addition, we have selected industries that are only limitedly confronted with competition 
from supermarkets and department stores. The following 13 industries (NACE-Belgium code) 
were found to fulfill these conditions best: Plumbing (45330), Painting (45441), Butcheries 
(52220), Bakeries (52240, 15812; retail sale and craftsmen of bread and confectionery), 
Pharmacies (52310), Clothing (52421-52424), Shoe stores (52431), Flower shops (52483), 
Jewelry (52484), Restaurants (55301), Fast food outlets (55302), Caterers (55522) and Real 
estate agencies (70311). 
Summary statistics of the number of incumbents (in 1998), entrants and exits are presented in 
Table 1. For entry and exit we provide data both for 1999 and for the three-year period 1999-
2001. The average number of incumbents per municipality range from 1.64 for jewelry and 
2.29 for shoe stores to 9.76 for fast food and 10.18 for restaurants. The average number of 
entrants and exits are both lowest for jewelry and both highest for fast food. Net entry is 
positive for five out of 13 industries (plumbing, painting, caterers, restaurants, real estate). In 
none of the retail industries we find a positive net entry. The fast food has the strongest 
growth in number of firms, with the butcheries and bakeries the strongest decline. Industries 
with relatively high (low) entry rates also have relatively high (low) exit rates. The 
distribution of municipalities in our sample according to population size is given in Figure 1.  
  
[Table 1 and Figure 1 about here] 
 
The entry threshold  in year t is computed using an ordered probit analysis since the 
threshold only takes integer values (starting at 0). The entry threshold is assumed to depend 
upon six exogenous variables. These are personal income per capita (PersInc), rate of 
*
tN
commuting, viz. net number of commuters per capita (Commute), population growth rate 
(PopGr) and Flanders, City and Border dummies as introduced earlier. In the ordered probit 
regression these variables are all multiplied with population (Pop) as in Bresnahan and Reiss 
(1991, p.979). Population and average personal income are included as key determinants of 
market size. We correct for the rate of commuting since many commuters may buy goods in 
the municipality where they work. We introduce a Flanders dummy to correct for potential 
regional differences in tastes (Belgium consists of three main regions: Flanders, Brussels and 
Wallonia with the latter two (predominantly) French-speaking). The City dummy is used to 
correct for demand effects of the presence of a large city nearby. The Border dummy corrects 
for possible demand effects of a municipality being on the border of France, Luxembourg, 
Germany or the Netherlands. The (latent) variable  is determined as: *tN
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The ordered probit maximum likelihood routine (Stata 8.0) renders estimates for the 
parameters 0α  through 6α  and the threshold values 1γ  through Mγ . The estimates for the 
parameters for each of the thirteen industries are presented in Table 2. The fit of the ordered 
probit model is relatively constant over the different industries. The average pseudo R2 for the 
thirteen industries is 0.1540. It ranges for a minimum of 0.1025 for caterers to a maximum of 
0.2058 for bakeries.  
The effect of personal income is significant for eight industries. Five times a significant 
positive effect is found: for plumbing, pharmacies, clothing, restaurants and real estate.2 It is  
significantly negative for butcheries, bakeries and fast food. The first two industries have 
suffered from hypermarkets introduced in the areas with most buying power. One can 
                                                 
2 The jewelry industry does not have a significant positive effect. This surprising outcome may be the result of 
most consumers buying jewelries in a nearby town. This is confirmed by the effects of the rate of commuting 
and the City dummy.  
juxtapose the negative effect for fast food to the positive effect for restaurants (serving 
traditional food). Fast food is a relatively cheap way of eating out. The effect of the rate of 
commuting is significant for seven industries, the majority of which positive. A positive effect 
is as expected since a positive net rate of commuting implies increased buying power. The 
effect of population growth (in the previous periods) is significant for eight industries. It is 
negative for butcheries, bakeries and flower shops. Cities in which population declines or is 
stagnant are likely to have a relatively high percentage of elderly. These are probably more 
likely to buy in the traditional butcheries and bakeries. The effect of population growth is very 
strong for the fast food and real estate industries. Those profit probably from a relatively 
young population. The Flanders dummy is significant for eight industries and only one is 
negative (pharmacies). The positive effect could be due to Flemish families having more 
financial means next to personal income or it could be due to a range of other cultural factors. 
The City dummy is eight times significant and only for plumbing there is a positive effect. 
Hence, in general shops in small municipalities suffer from the presence of larger cities 
nearby. The Border dummy is only significant for four industries and all of these effects are 
negative. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
3. Entry and exit adjusting for disequilibrium 
 
For each of the industries in Table 2 we computed the predicted number of firms in a 
municipality, . This is used to compute the market ‘disequilibrium’: the difference between 
the predicted and actual number of firms, . A positive difference indicates ‘market 
room’ for new entry, while a negative difference indicates lack of ‘market room’. 
Entrepreneurs who are alert to profit opportunities are more likely to enter local markets with 
considerable ‘market room’ when compared to more saturated markets. Entrepreneurs in 
crowded local markets (who make losses) are more likely to leave than entrepreneurs in 
unsaturated markets, maybe to enter other more promising local markets. Hence, we expect 
that local markets in which the predicted number of firms exceeds the actual number to show 
higher entry rates, lower exit rates and, consequently, higher net entry rates than local markets 
in which the actual number exceeds the predicted number.  
tNˆ
tt NN −ˆ
In Table 3 we test this by means of regressions of the number of entrants in period t, , the 
number of exiting firms in period t, , and the difference (net entry), , on the 
preceding ‘market room’ variable  and on the preceding stock of firms . The 
period t-1 is always 1998. The results for period t are given for 1999 (one-year reaction) and 
1999-2001 (three-year reaction).
tE
tX tt XE −
11
ˆ −− − tt NN 1−tN
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
The results clearly indicate that entry is indeed positively affected by ‘market room’. Nine out 
of 13 industries have a significant positive effect and none of the industries have a negative 
effect in case the year 1999 is chosen. In case the three-year period 1999-2001 is chosen, all 
thirteen industries show a significant positive effect. The results for exit are quite different. 
For the year 1999 there are only two industries showing a significant effect, one positive 
(restaurants) and only one the expected negative effect (butcheries). For the years 1999-2001 
there are five industries with a significant effect, but each of them positive. However, the 
results for entry are stronger than those found for exit, resulting in most industries to have a 
positive effect for net entry. The one exception is Bakeries.4
The results suggest that net entry indeed adjusts for disequilibrium. For four industries 
(Painting, Pharmacies, Flowers, Caterers) this adjustment is more than 10% for a three-year 
period. However, for other industries this adjustment can be more modest. The results also 
indicate that the adjustment for disequilibrium mainly takes places through differences in 
entry rates between municipalities.5 This suggests that when the actual number of firms is 
higher than the available ‘market room’, a negative net entry rate is caused by a lower entry 
rate rather than by a higher exit rate.   
 
                                                 
3 We also computed these results in case of using a backward stepwise ordered probit regression as the first step. 
All results concerning significance effects were confirmed. Regression analysis instead of a count data method is 
chosen as the second step because net entry can be negative and has no natural lower limit. Unreported Poisson-
type analyses give qualitatively similar results and are available upon request.  
4 The unexpected effect of market disequilibrium for Bakeries led us to a further investigation of this industry. 
An official of the Belgian Confederation of the Bakery, Pastry, Chocolate and Ice-Cream industry suggested that 
the growing number of bakeries selling their products through multiple locations – breaking the traditional one 
producer - one selling point relationship could account for this. This type of restructuring was taking place 
mostly in cities. We have tested the assumption that the effect of market room on net entry was dependent upon 
municipality population size. We found indeed that the negative effect is strongest for the municipalities with 
most inhabitants in our sample.  
5 This confirms earlier findings in Carree and Thurik (1999). 
4. Conclusion 
 
We derive a relationship between local market size and number of firms for thirteen different 
Belgian retail and service industries (in 1998) using ordered probit analysis. We investigate 
whether markets that have higher (lower) actual than predicted numbers of firms show exit 
(entry) in subsequent periods of one and three years. The results confirm that over a three-
year period the rate of (net) entry is positively affected by the presence of market ‘room’. The 
exit rate, however, does not show a negative relation with market ‘room’. This indicates that 
changes in entry rates are a more likely source of adjusting for market disequilibria than 
changes in exit rates. The speed of adjustment is relatively low for most industries, however.   
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Table 1: Summary statistics: Averages across municipalities 
 
Industry  Stock98 Entry99 Exit99 Entry99-01 Exit99-01 
 
Plumbing   9.35 (32) 0.55 (4) 0.49 (4) 1.66 (7) 1.57 (7) 
Painting   4.75 (19) 0.30 (4) 0.29 (4) 0.95 (7) 0.89 (6) 
Butcheries   6.51 (28) 0.26 (3) 0.43 (5) 0.65 (6) 1.39 (12) 
Bakeries   9.42 (67) 0.51 (4) 0.76 (5) 1.52 (7) 2.18 (9) 
Pharmacies   4.54 (23) 0.22 (3) 0.23 (4) 0.56 (4) 0.68 (6)  
Clothing   5.73 (54) 0.41 (5) 0.49 (6) 1.21 (8) 1.40 (14) 
Shoe stores   2.29 (13) 0.13 (2) 0.20 (3) 0.39 (3) 0.59 (6) 
Flower shops  4.64 (19) 0.32 (3) 0.34 (3) 0.87 (5) 0.96 (7) 
Jewelry   1.64 (10) 0.06 (2) 0.11 (2) 0.18 (3) 0.30 (3) 
Restaurants 10.18 (91) 0.91 (9) 0.74 (8) 2.71 (22) 2.24 (20) 
Fast food   9.76 (80) 1.13 (6) 1.16 (9) 3.33 (23) 3.33 (25) 
Caterers   3.24 (13) 0.28 (3) 0.23 (4) 0.81 (4) 0.71 (6) 
Real estate   4.70 (62) 0.40 (5) 0.32 (4) 1.19 (13) 0.96 (9) 
 
Note: The maximum number of firms across municipalities per category is given between brackets. 
The minimum number is always zero. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of municipalities according to population size 
Table 2: Ordered probit regression results (all multiplied with population) 
 
Industry const  PersInc Commute PopGr Flanders City  Border 
 
Plumbing  0.148***  0.218** -0.008  0.391*** -0.015  0.037***  0.012 
  (0.041) (0.099) (0.051) (0.136) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Painting  0.234*** -0.126  0.049  0.034  0.031*** -0.029** -0.020 
  (0.041) (0.098) (0.051) (0.136) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Butcheries  0.409*** -0.486*** -0.085* -0.481***  0.061*** -0.034*** -0.017 
  (0.043) (0.100) (0.051) (0.137) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Bakeries  0.574*** -0.560***  0.008 -0.278**  0.054*** -0.044*** -0.025* 
  (0.045) (0.100) (0.051) (0.137) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Pharmacies  0.127***  0.419*** -0.128** -0.130 -0.052*** -0.015 -0.028**
  (0.041) (0.102) (0.052) (0.138) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Clothing  0.195***  0.236**  0.237***  0.043  0.033*** -0.051*** -0.017 
  (0.041) (0.099) (0.053) (0.136) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Shoe stores  0.271*** -0.109  0.152*** -0.178  0.031*** -0.041*** -0.016
   (0.042) (0.101) (0.053) (0.140) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) 
Flowers  0.262*** -0.006 -0.064 -0.254*  0.030*** -0.018 -0.000 
  (0.042) (0.099) (0.052) (0.137) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Jewelry  0.229***  0.009  0.195*** -0.142 -0.006 -0.037*** -0.019 
  (0.042) (0.101) (0.054) (0.141) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) 
Restaurants 0.180***  0.195**  0.204***  0.233*  0.005 -0.054*** -0.001 
  (0.040) (0.098) (0.052) (0.136) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) 
Fast food  0.401*** -0.289***  0.065  0.684***  0.038*** -0.010  0.006 
  (0.042) (0.099) (0.051) (0.138) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Caterers  0.114***  0.134  0.007  0.303** -0.008 -0.012 -0.030** 
  (0.041) (0.099) (0.052) (0.138) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Real estate -0.096** 0.714***   0.114**  0.540*** -0.016 -0.008 -0.030** 
  (0.041) (0.102) (0.052) (0.138) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
 
Note: ***, ** and * mean significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. The 
exogenous variables are presented in columns.
Table 3: Regression results for entry, exit and net entry adjusting for disequilibrium 
 
Industry  Ent99 Exit99 NE99 Ent9901 Exit9901 NE9901 
 
Plumbing    0.015  0.007  0.007  0.064***  0.041**  0.023 
   (0.013) (0.011) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020) (0.026) 
Painting    0.053*** -0.015  0.068***  0.153***  0.043*  0.111*** 
   (0.016) (0.014) (0.020) (0.029) (0.024) (0.033) 
Butcheries    0.018* -0.027*  0.045***  0.044** -0.007  0.051** 
   (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023) 
Bakeries    0.015  0.015 -0.000  0.043**  0.080*** -0.037* 
   (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) 
Pharmacies    0.075***  0.019  0.056***  0.110*** -0.002  0.112*** 
   (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) 
Clothing    0.020*  0.009  0.010  0.080*** -0.007  0.088*** 
   (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.018) (0.015) (0.022) 
Shoe stores   0.029* -0.008  0.036  0.090*** -0.001  0.091** 
   (0.016) (0.019) (0.022) (0.027) (0.031) (0.036) 
Flowers   0.047*** -0.012  0.058***  0.114*** -0.001  0.115*** 
   (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031) 
Jewelry   0.014 -0.012  0.026  0.073***  0.046*  0.027 
   (0.013) (0.017) (0.021) (0.024) (0.026) (0.033) 
Restaurants  0.001  0.027*** -0.025**  0.033**  0.025**  0.008 
   (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) 
Fast food    0.019** -0.009  0.028**  0.073***  0.014  0.058*** 
   (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) 
Caterers    0.069*** -0.009  0.078***  0.182***  0.050  0.132*** 
   (0.020) (0.018) (0.027) (0.034) (0.033) (0.044) 
Real estate    0.014*  0.001  0.013  0.056***  0.016  0.040** 
   (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.020) 
 
Average R2   0.1393  0.2031  0.0357  0.2666  0.4149  0.0812 
 
Note: ***, ** and * mean significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Ent99 
is entry in 1999; Exit99 is exit in 1999; NE99 is net entry in 1999; Ent9901 is entry in the years 1999-
2001; Exit9901 is exit in the years 1999-2001; NE9901 is net entry in the years 1999-2001. 
